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Unemployment compensation .- Unenmploymncnt compensation benefits
were increased by the 1951 Legislative session from $15.00 per week, where
the highest quarter of the base period shows earnings of $345.01 per week
or over, to $20.00 per week, where the highest quarter of the base period
shows earnings of $520.01.1 A partially unemployed man may now earn
up to $5.00 per week and still draw unemployment compensation benefits
where prior to 1951 only $3.00 per week could be earned.2
Attorney fees for representation of claimants are now payable by the
Florida Industrial Commission when the cause reaches a circuit court
level and when the claimant's attorney is successful in increasing benefits
for the claimant, or when the review to the circuit court was initiated by
any party to the proceeding other than the claimant.3
By election, the state and political subdivisions thereof, may now
bring themselves under the jurisdiction of the Unemployment Compensation
Law.4
Prior to 1953, appeals from the decisions of referees, on claims, were
made to a Board of Review composed of three members appointed by the
governor.' The Board of Review is now composed of the chairman of
the Florida Industrial Commission, the director of the Unemployment
Compensation Division, and the appeals supervisor of the Florida Industrial
Commission.0
Apprentices.-Chapter 446 of the Laws of 1947,7 relating to the
education and training of future skilled chaftsinen for industry, has been
amended to provide for an apprenticeship department and a policy
making council with a general shift of the control.8
Where formerly the secretat of the Apprenticeship Council, Florida
Industrial Commission, administered the voluntary apprenticeship program,
assisted by local apprenticeship committees, 9 the legislature has amended
the law by establishing a Department of Apprenticeship within the Florida
Industrial Commission to administer the apprenticeship laws in accord with
the standards and policies of a State Apprenticeship Council.10
*Mcnber of the Florida Bar.
1. FLA. STAT. § 443.04(2) (1951).
2. FLA. STAT. § 443.04(3) (b) (1951).
3. FL1A. STAT. § 443.16(2)(b)(I) et seq. (1951).4  LA. STAT. § 443.09(3) (b) (1951).
5. FLA. STAT. § 443.11(2) a) (1937).
6. FLA. STAT. § 443,11(2) a) (1953).
7. FLA, STA'r. § 446.06-.13 (1947)
8, FLA. STAT. § '46.06-.10, 446.13 (1953).
9. FLA. STAT. § 446.06 (1947 & 1949).
10. FLA. STAT. § 446.06-.09 (1953).
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The newly-created State Apprenticeship Council is a policy and standard
making agency composed of teni members, the chairman of which is the
chairman of the Florida Industrial Commission. The supervisor of Trade
and Industrial Education, of the Department of Public Instruction, must
be appointed to the council, as a consultant, without a vote. In addition,
the governor appoints eight others: four from industry and four from
labor, to represent the building and construction industry, metal trades and
shipyards, printing industry, and aircraft industry, with terms to run
concurrently with that of the governor. The council has power to issue
rules and regulations necessary to carry out the standards and policies
established and must report its activities to the governor once a year.'1
A director of the Department of Apprenticeship is to be appointed
by the Florida Industrial Commission. The director becomes the executive
secretary of the council and working in conjunction with local joint
apprenticeship committees, he is empowered to administer the apprenticeship
program; including, establishing conditions and standards for apprenticeship
agreements, registering approved apprentice programs and agreements,
terminating or cancelling apprentice agreements, keeping records and issuing
certificates of completion of apprenticeship training.' 2  The Trade and
Industrial Education Division of the Department of Public Instruction still
supervises the classroom work of apprentices in related and supplemental
instruction, which is in addition to on-the-job training, but such supervision
is subject to the approval of the council.'3
Prevailing wages.-Wagcs to be paid to labor on public buildings
or works are now protected by an amendment to Section 215.19, which
requires that in every contract in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000) to
which the state, any county, city, political subdivision or public authority
is a party, there shall be a provision that the rate of wages for such labor
employed by the contractor or sub-contractor shall not be less than the
prevailing rate of wages for similar classification of work in the city, town,
village or other civil division of the state where the public work is located. 4
Formerly, only laborers and mechanics were included under this
section, but now, by amendment, apprentices are included to work under
registered apprentice agreements approved by the apprenticeship council. 15
Determination of the prevailing wages or the proper classification of
skills of employees is first considered by the contracting officer, and, if the
matter is not settled, it is then referred to the Secretary of State, who
may call on the Florida Industrial Commission for technical assistance.
Unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise, the complete hearing on
11. FLA. STAT. § 446.08 (1953).
12. FLA. STAT. § 446.09 (1953).
13. FLA. STAT. § 446.10 (1953).
14. FLA. STAT. § 215.19(1)( ) (1953),
15. FL.t STAT. § 215.19(1) (h) (1953).
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the dispute is to be held in the city or county where the work is located.The decision of the Secretary of State is conclusive on the parties.' 6
Public roads or highways arc not included as public works or buildings:
however, bridges on sucl pulblic roads or highways are included if the
contract amounts to fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or more, or if the
bridge is located iii any county having a population of one hundred
thousand (100,000) according to the last census.' 7
Before the 1953 amendment to the "prevailing wage" statute, contracts
for the construction, alteration or repair of public buildings, amounting to
more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), to whicl the State of Florida
was a party, were required to contain a provision stating that the prevailing
rate of wages of the area would be paid to laborers and mechanics. The
Secretary of State was given the final power to determine the rate of
wages in case of a dispute.' 8
In a test ease taken to the Supreme Court of Florida in 1950, which
affirmed the opinion of the lower court without opinion, a County Board
of Public Instruction was held not to be included under the term "State
of Florida" and within the purposes of the statute before the present
amendment, so that a contract for the construction of a school must
include within it a prevailing rate clause.' 9  As an outgrowth of this
determination, and the general interest of labor and contractors alike, the
prevailing wage statute was amended to include subdivisions ind
municipalities of the State of Florida.
Public Utility Arbitration Act.-In Henderson v. State ex rel. Lee and
-enderson v. State ex Tel. Frazier,2" companion cases, the Public Utility
Arbitration Act,2' which substitutes compulsory arbitration for collective
bargaining whenever an impasse is reached in the bargaining process and
which prohibits strikes against public utilities, was held invalid and
unconstitutional in that it conflicted with the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.22 The
statute conflicts with the federal law to the same extent as the Wisconsin
Public Utilities Act, which was ruled invalid by the United States Supreme
Court in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach
Employees of America, Division 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board. "  The labor dispute in Florida, which involved a public utility,
was affecting interstate commerce and was therefore within the scope of
the National Labor Relations Act. On this basis it was held that it was
unlawful to arrest officials of the union, for violation of the state act, who,
16. FtA. STAT. § 215.19(3) 1953).
17. FLA. STAT. § 215.19(3) (1953).
18. FLA. STAT. § 215.19 3).
19. Gwaltney v. Rutherford, 49 Sold 105 (Fia. 1950).
20. 65 So.2d 22 (Fia. 1953).
21. FLA. STAT. c. 453 (1953).
22. 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1947).
23. 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
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while continuing to bargain, refused to submit to compulsory arbitration
and called a strike against the utility.
Labor agreements.-An agreement between various unions and con-
tractors in the construction industry to form a construction industry council
empowered to establish for the industry, working conditions, including wage
rates, was held to be a collective bargaining agreement which is binding
on the unions in Carpenters' District Council v. Miami Chapter of Associated
General Contractors.24 An attempt by one of the unions to compel
contractors to pay wage rates higher than those established by the council
is a breach of such an agreement. In the public interest and in protection
of the contractual rights of the parties, the union may be enjoined for
threatening to expel or otherwise coerce its members who do not insist
upon being paid the higher rates of pay.
Local No. 234 v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc.,25 holds an entire collective
bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop" provision to be totally
void and not merely voidable, and neither party may seek a declaration
of rights and declaratory decree under such a contract.
A plumbing contractor sought a declaration of its rights under a
bargaining agreement which the union had repudiated. The agreement
contained a provision that no employer would employ any mechanic who
was not a member in good standing of the union. Motion to dismiss
was denied by the lower court, and on a petition for writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court considered two questions: (1) whether the contract was
violative of the public policy of the state because it attempted to create
a closed shop status between the union and the employer; and (2) assuming
the contract did contain a provision for a closed shop, whether the entire
contract was void. The court reaffirmed its holding in Local Union No.
519 v. Robertson,21 that a "closed shop" purpose is illegal and against the
declared public policy of the state. It further held that an agreement
containing such a provision is void in toto, and not severable, and
consequently the parties to the contract are left without a remedy or relief
by a declaratory decree.
Right to picket.-Peaceful picketing to protest the discharge of union
employees was held not enjoinable, in Hotel and Restaurant Employees' and
Bartenders' Union Local No. 156 v. Cothron, -7 even though the union
requested a closed shop contract. The lower court found that the picketing
was not in protest of the refusal of the closed shop contract, but rather in
protest of the discharge of employees solely because they belonged to
the union, but, nevertheless, the chancellor enjoined the union because
sufficient notice of the reason for the picket was not given to the employer.
24. 55 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1951).
25. 66 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1953).
26. 44 So.2d 899 (FRa. 1950).
27. 59 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1952).
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'The Supreme Court dissolved the injunction and upheld the right to picket
on the grounds that the findings of the lower court showed a lawful
purpose for the picket and Florida law requires no notice of a strike or a
reason for a picket. In Miami Typographical Union v. Ormerod,28 suit
was brought by -employecs of the Miami Herald to enjoin picketing by
striking employees and members of the defendant union. The Supreme
Court reiterated the general rule that the right to engage in peaceful
picketing in a labor dispute can be lost if there is violence in the background
of the picketing, or if the purpose of the picketing is illegal.
The union contended that it was merely exercising its rights in a
labor dispute by conveying information by pickets, under free speech. It
was decided by the lower court, and affirmed, that the purpose of the
picketing was to coerce the employer to force its employees to join the
union, and to annoy the non-union employees so they would join the
union. In reaching this conclusion, the court laid great emphasis on the
wording of the placards carried by the picketers, which named working
employees, gave their addresses, and called them "scabs," adding that the
union was on strike. This the court considered intimidatory.
The chancellor's permanent injunction restraining all picketing was
upheld in that the record revealed evidence of violence, which, though
not directly linking the union to the long past acts, inferentially permitted
the drawing of some casual relationship. Even if the acts of violence, in
the background, were too remote in time to be the basis of the injunction
order, the finding that the purpose of the picket was to coerce the employer
to grant bargaining rights to the union when it did not represent working
employees, and to coerce employees, through fear, to join the union, both
being illegal purposes, were sufficient to substantiate the broad permanent
injunction.
Injunctive relief in this case is allowed on the basis of illegal purpose
and violence in the background of a picket, and is a mere repeat of prior
reasons for injunctions against picketing, as in Local Union No. 519 v.
Robertson,D and Moore v. City Dry Cleaners & Ltundry, Inc.30  This
case is new law in Florida because it is the working employees asking
relief by injunction, not the employer.
Right to sue or be sued.-Section 447.11' provides that any labor
organization may maintain an. action in its commonly used name and
shall be subject to suit in its commonly used name in the same manner
and to the same extent as any corporation authorized to do business in this
state. Process in such action may be served on the president or other
28. 61 So.Zd 753 (Fla. 1952); see Note, 7 MNLhi L.Q. 434 (1953).
29. 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
30. 41 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1949).
31. FLA. STAT. (1953).
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officer, business agent, manager or person in charge of the business of such
labor organization.
In International Typographical Union v. Ormerod,3 2 the defendant
union appeared specially to contest service of process claimed to be
defective under the statute relating to service on a foreign corporation .33
It was held that since the defendant union operated within the state as
an unincorporated labor organization, service of process may be made upon
the president, or other officer or business agent, manager or person in charge
of the business of the union, under the statute relating to labor.?4  Unlike
the requirements for service on a foreign corporation, it is not necessary
to show that other officers are absent from the state before service can
be made on the business agent of a labor organization. Where the
"return" of the sheriff shows service upon the business agent, it is sufficient
to satisfy the statutory requirement, the conclusion being that unions
cannot sue or cannot be sued to the exact same extent as "any corporation
authorized to do business in this state."
In Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Jnternational,35 one group of
airline pilots brought suit for injunction against an association of airline
pilots to enjoin the defendant association from acting as bargaining
representatives of all pilot employees of a certain airline. It was argued
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the defendants were an
unincorporated association and that service must be made, as by common
law, on each member of the association. The lower court dismissed the
complaint on the jurisdictional point. The Supreme Court reversed, saying
that jurisdiction was acquired under the special statute on service of labor
unions,36 even though the said chapter states "all railway labor organizations
and members thereof shall be exempt from all of the provisions of this
chapter as long as they are regulated by any act or acts of the Congress
of the United States." '  Pilots admittedly come under the Railway Labor
Act. The association was held to be the agent of the plaintiff pilots, as
it bargained and acted for them, so that process and service on a regional
vice president and a representative of the association was sufficient to give
the circuit court jurisdiction over the association.
Miami Laundry Co. v. Laundry, Linen Drycleaning Drivers8 held
that a labor union could not ask injunctive relief against an employer for
discharge of employee members because of union membership, or for
reinstatement of discharged union employees, saying such rights were
individual and that a labor organization has no agency standing in behalf
of members.
32. 50 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1952).
33. FtA. STAT. § 41.17 (1953).
34. FiL. STAT. § 447.11 (1953).
35. 52 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1951).
36. FLA. STAT. § 447.11 (1953).
37. FLA. STAT. § 447.15 (1953).
38. 41 So.ld 305 (Fla. 1949).
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It would appear from the cases, supra, that the theory of agency is
applicable when a labor organization is the defendant but not when it is
a plaintiff, though no actual distinguishing difference is discernible.
CONCLUSION
Unemployment benefits are paid because of earned credits made to
the workers account. A maximum benefit of $20.00 per week is inadequate
to meet the minimum requirements of any individual, or family, during a
period of unemployment. Since contributions are made in the employee's
behalf based on his earnings and he has a vested interest in a benefit for
the emergency of unemployment, the weekly amount should be incrased
by the legislature so that the purpose of the Act is not defeated. The low
maximum payment merely takes the cost of unemployment out of industry
and places the problem of indigent persons at the door of welfare
agencies.
A December 14, 1953 decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States has settled a conflict in labor law which has existed for many years.39
By limiting state courts' jurisdiction to enjoin picketing, where interstate
commerce is affected, to cases of violence, mass picketing, threatening of
employees, obstructing streets and highways, or picketing homes, is involved.
Where it can be shown interstate commerce is affected and the illegal
purpose claimed as the basis for injunctive relief is also an unfair labor
practice under the Taft-lartley amendment of the Labor Management
Relations Act, the injunctive relief will have to be secured by petition and
complaint to the National Labor Relations Board and the state courts
will have no jurisdiction?9
A complete revision of the statutory labor law of Florida, enacted in
1943, would be desirable for industry, the public and labor. This is a
fast growing state and the present statutory law has little relation to
realistic problems which arise.40 The present law lacks a workable pattern
for use in that any administration takes place in and through the courts.
A progressive and workable labor law should incorporate a state agency
as the administrative head to insure uniformity of its application. A labor
law planned for present problems should provide a balanced negative and
postive labor pattern. Subjects covered should include collective bargaining,
the emergencies of strikes, picketing and boycotts, regulation of labor
unions, jurisdiction for injunctions, unfair employment practices of
employer and labor, minimum wages and hours, wage payment protection,
and some form of mediation of disputes. Though as a legislative program
the above may appear to be broad in scope the present law incorporating
penalties without the counterbalance of enforceable rights has proved of
little value in labor-management problems and has done little by way of
contribution to the economic health of the state.
39. Garner and Garner v. Teamsters. Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776,
74 Sup. Ct. 161 (1953).
40. FLA. STAT. c. 447 (1953).
